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Abstract 
We study the interaction between consumption and health in retirement. Our main contribution is 
the estimation of a consumption Euler equation taking health into consideration. The Euler 
equation is derived from a model of consumption in retirement with three important building 
blocks of health: health shocks, health as an investment and health as a provider of utility. We 
estimate the Euler equation using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and 
Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS). The estimates suggest that health is an 
important determinant of utility. We use the estimated model to study the empirical significance 
of the three building blocks of health. We find that health shocks play an important role in 
slowing down the decline of consumption with age in retirement. We also find that including 
health into the utility function could help explain the heterogeneous consumption-age profiles 
related to health. Finally, we find that health investments, such as physical exercise, have a 
significant effect on the evolutions of both health and consumption in retirement. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, we seek to further our understanding of the process through which consumption 
and health interact and how this affects the well-being of the elderly. In particular, we integrate 
health capital into a life-cycle model of consumption to better understand the interrelationship 
between health, health investments, mortality risk, and wealth in retirement.  
Incorporating health into a life-cycle model of wealth accumulation is, in our view, very 
important. Existing models of consumption behavior for working households largely ignore 
health production, at least for working-age households. But one potentially important response to 
adverse income or health shocks or to governmental policy changes is for individuals to adjust 
health investment in addition to consumption. Changes in health investment can alter 
individual’s health and have longer-run implications for mortality. Our innovation is not just to 
incorporate health as an investment that increases an individual’s health stock but also to 
incorporate health in the utility function. This allows health to affect the marginal utility of 
consumption and the allocation of consumption over the life cycle. 
Health and consumption decisions are intertwined, yet the ways that consumption and 
health interact are hard to untangle.  Health changes, such as disability or illness, affect labor 
market decisions and, hence, income and consumption possibilities.  But causality also operates 
in the other direction, where consumption decisions, such as smoking or exercise affect health.  
There are also unobserved differences between people in their ability to produce and maintain 
health and human capital, leading to correlations between health and lifetime income and wealth.  
This paper examines links between health, consumption, and wealth. Surprisingly, given the 
centrality of health to economic decision-making and well-being, numerical models of life-cycle 
consumption choices generally treat health in a highly stylized fashion.  Authors commonly do 
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not model health as being an argument of utility and do not allow health to affect longevity (see, 
for example, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Engen, Gale, Uccello, 1999; Palumbo, 1999; 
and Scholz, Seshadri, Khitatrakun, 2006). Instead medical expense shocks that proxy for health 
shocks affect the lifetime budget constraint. Households in these papers respond to exogenous 
medical expense shocks by decreasing consumption, saving for precautionary reasons. 
In the life-cycle consumption papers noted above, households will respond to cuts in 
safety net programs by increasing precautionary saving.  In the real world, households might 
maintain consumption at the cost of activities that degrade health and consequently affect 
longevity. In practice, these health-reducing activities might include working an additional job 
(and foregoing sleep); foregoing exercise; or eating high-calorie, inexpensive fast food rather 
than healthier home-cooked meals.  Over the long run, the consequences of these decisions can 
be large.  Depending on lifetime earnings or the economic environment, other households may 
sharply increase precautionary saving in a world without health-related social insurance.  Our 
model provides quantitative insight about these responses. We are not the first to examine the 
links between health, consumption, and wealth.  Clear discussions are given in Smith (2005), 
Case and Deaton (2005), and many other places.  We build on the important recent papers by De 
Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), and Fonseca, Michaud, Galama, and Kapteyn (2009). Our 
paper is also related to Finkelstein et. al. (2013). Since we have a fully specified optimizing 
model with data on consumption, health status, and lifetime earnings, we can get around the 
issue of having to measure utility. 
Our prior work shows that these links between health, wealth, and mortality are 
potentially important. For example, we examine the effects of altering the Medicare program — 
the health care social insurance program for those 65 and older. For example, if Medicare were 
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unanticipatedly removed, we show that there would be only negligible effects on mortality rates 
in the first 10 years following its removal.  This is due to the fact that health status at age 65 is 
largely determined by decisions households made at younger ages.  
Our main contribution in this paper is the estimation of a consumption Euler equation 
taking health into consideration. The Euler equation is derived from a model of consumption in 
retirement with three important building blocks of health: health shocks, health as an investment, 
and health as a provider of utility. In our model, a retiree maximizes lifetime utility by making 
decisions on consumption and health investments in each period. The utility flow in each period 
depends on both consumption and health capital. Health investments could affect both the 
probability of surviving to the next period and future health capital conditional on survival.  
There are health shocks in each period such that both survival and future health capital 
conditional on survival are stochastic.  
We estimate the Euler equation of our model using data from both the core Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and the supplemental Consumption and Activities Mail Survey 
(CAMS). Our estimation takes two steps. In the first step, we use all respondents in the HRS to 
estimate inputs into the structural model including the survival probabilities as a function of 
current age, health status, and health investments. In the second step, we use respondents at age 
65 or older with valid information on consumption and health to estimate the structural 
parameters of the model, including the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the share of 
consumption in the consumption-health composite good that produces utility. We estimate the 
model separately for each gender. Our estimates suggest that health is an important determinant 
of utility.  
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We use the estimated model to study the empirical significance of the three health 
building blocks. We find that health shocks play an important role in slowing down the decline 
of consumption with age in retirement. Without health shocks, retirees will run down their 
wealth at a much higher speed. We also find that including health into the utility function 
provides interesting interactions between health and consumption, and could help explain the 
heterogeneous consumption-age profiles related to health. Finally, we find that health 
investments, such as physical exercise, have a significant effect on the evolutions of retirement 
health and consumption. This finding suggests that public programs like Medicare and Medicaid 
play an important role in shaping the consumption and health behavior of the retirees, as well as 
the retirement and saving decisions of working people.    
In terms of policy, the central insight that arises from our work is that long-run 
adjustments to changes in the institutional environment can be substantial. As an example, 
consider the removal of Medicare or Medicaid. Relative to a standard life-cycle model of 
consumption without endogenous health production, the consumption responses in our model 
will be smaller, since a portion of the response occurs through a diminution of health capital. 
With less health capital, households correctly anticipate that they will die younger and, hence, 
they need to accumulate less wealth to finance consumption in retirement. Thus, the model with 
endogenous health mitigates the effects of social insurance changes on consumption relative to 
standard life-cycle models.  
We believe our work has important potential benefits to Social Security policy-making. 
Our model recognized the varied ways that individuals build health capital. In particularly, an 
extensive literature documents that there appears to be very low returns to marginal investments 
in health, at least given health capital levels observed in the United States. Nevertheless, there is 
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a strong positive relationship between affluence, whether measured by lifetime income or wealth, 
and health, whether measured by health status, functional limitations, or mortality. Our model 
allows people to invest in health through direct expenditures on medical inputs and through time 
spent on health-producing activities, such as exercise or preparing nutritious meals. Although we 
only consider physical exercise in the empirical application of this paper, an extended version of 
the model would yield predictions on the patterns of medical expenditures (in dollars) over the 
life cycle, time used in health-producing activities over the life cycle, life-cycle patterns of 
health, and predictions about mortality. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the first section below, we introduce the 
data and provide some facts that motivate our study. We present our model in the second section 
and estimate it in the third section. In the fourth section, we use the estimated model to study the 
channels through which health interacts with consumption. We conclude the paper in Section 5.  
Data and Motivation 
We use data from the core Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and its supplement, the 
Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS). The HRS is sponsored by the National 
Institute of Aging and conducted by the University of Michigan with supplemental support from 
the Social Security Administration. It is a national panel study with a sample (in 1992) of 12,652 
persons in 7,702 households. The baseline 1992 study consisted of in-home, face-to-face 
interviews of the 1931-41 birth cohort and their spouses if they were married. Follow up 
interviews have continued every two years. As the HRS has matured, new cohorts have been 
added. We use the RAND HRS Version O, which is a representative, randomly stratified sample 
of U.S. households born before 1959. 
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The CAMS is an ongoing supplement to the HRS. One of its primary objectives is to 
measure total household spending during the previous 12 months. In September 2001, the first 
CAMS survey was mailed to 5,000 households selected at random from households that 
participated in the HRS 2000 core survey. Follow up surveys have been fielded biennially in 
odd-numbered years. We use the RAND CAMS Version D, Release 2. The measure of total 
household consumption is available for six waves. We use CPI-U to convert the consumption 
measures in different years into constant dollars. 
We link the two datasets to study the interaction between consumption and health in 
retirement. 
Consumption, Health and Health Investments 
As a motivation for the importance of including health in modeling consumption of the elderly, 
we combine wave nine of the HRS and CAMS and report in Table 1 mean household 
consumption by lifetime earnings1 and self-reported health status. The mean consumption of 
households in the third earnings quintile who reported to be in good health is normalized to be 
one. 
  
                                                                
1 Lifetime earnings are constructed using restricted-access social security earnings data, as well as self-reported 
earnings in the HRS. See Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) for details. 
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Table 1. Mean Household Consumption by Earnings and Health 
Lifetime Earnings
Health First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Excellent 0.93 1.02 1.15 1.29 1.68
Very Good 0.75 0.91 1.2 1.23 1.55
Good 0.69 0.88 1 1.13 1.38
Fair 0.64 0.73 0.87 1.04 1.29
Poor 0.61 0.71 0.79 0.92 1.24
 
Consumption rises with income for each health status and consumption rises with health 
status for each income quintile. For example, for respondents in the third quintile of lifetime 
earnings, those in excellent health on average spend 15% more on consumption than those in 
good health, while the consumption of those in poor health is only about 79% of the 
consumption of those in good health. The fact that consumption co-moves with health status in 
the cross-section is consistent with consumption-health complementarity in preferences. We 
allow for this possibility in the model presented in the next section. We will also look at changes 
across the retired years by age to identify the relationship between consumption and health in the 
utility function. 
If health and consumption are related, a model of health is necessary in order to 
understand the evolution of consumption in retirement. Starting from Grossman (1972), health 
has been modeled as a capital good where people can make investments. The HRS provides 
extensive measures of health investments. These measures can be categorized into three groups.  
The first group includes measures of medical care utilization, such as hospital stays, nursing 
home stays, doctor visits, home care, and whether the respondent reported regular use of 
prescription drugs, outpatient surgery, dental visits, or use of special facilities or services during 
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the reference period. The second group includes measures of medical expenditures. The last 
group includes health behaviors like participation in physical activity/exercise, drinking, 
smoking, and preventive behaviors like a blood test for cholesterol, a flu shot, monthly self-
checks for breast lumps, a mammogram, a pap smear, and a check for prostate cancer. 
To provide suggestive evidence of the effects of health investments, we use the variables 
measuring participation in vigorous physical activities to study the effect of excise on mortality. 
The first six waves of the HRS record whether a respondent participated in rigorous physical 
activities three or more times each week. Starting from the seventh wave, this variable is now 
replaced by another one indicating whether a respondent participated in rigorous physical 
activities for two or more times each week. We combine these two variables to create a dummy 
that equals to one if a respondent participated in rigorous physical activities for either three or 
more times (first six waves) or two or more times (subsequent waves). We will refer to this 
dummy variable as exercise. 
We calculate the effect of exercise on mortality as follows. For respondents at a given age 
with a given health status, we calculate the fractions of these individuals surviving to the next 
survey according to their exercise status. We calculate the survival probabilities separately for 
each gender and report them in Figures 1 and 2. Because the survey is conducted every two 
years, this calculation gives us the two-year survival probabilities. We use the LOWESS 
command in STATA to smooth the raw survival probabilities over age. To save space, we only 
report the results for the two extreme self-reported health statuses. 
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Figure 1. Survival Probabilities by Age, Health, and Activity Status: Men 
 
Figure 2. Survival Probabilities by Age, Health, and Activity Status: Women 
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Not surprisingly, the survival probabilities are higher for respondents in the better health 
status at all ages. Conditional on self-reported current health status, those who participate in 
rigorous physical activities are more likely to survive than those who don’t. For example, among 
women in poor health at age 65, around 84% of those who don’t exercise can survive for another 
two years, and the number increases to about 93% for those who exercise. The difference is 
about 9%. This difference seems to increase with age. For example, at age 80, the difference is 
about 15%. The facts that those who exercise are more likely to survive than those who don’t and 
this advantage increases with age hold for men and women and for both health statuses. It also 
appears that exercise’s effect on survival decreases with health: Those in poor health could 
benefit more from exercise than those in good or excellent health.  
To summarize, Figure 1 suggests that health investments, such as physical exercise, have 
a positive effect on future health and the effect is larger for individuals in poor health. We allow 
for this possibility in the model presented below. 
Model 
We model the consumption decision of single (divorced, never married, or widowed) retirees 
taking into account the effect of health. Retirees face different paths of income (𝑦𝑦 = {𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡}) and 
prices (𝑝𝑝 = {𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡}) of health investments over the remaining years of their lives.2 Income (𝑦𝑦) is 
determined by lifetime earnings before retirement, and the prices (𝑝𝑝) of health investments is 
determined by factors such as health insurance. Both 𝑦𝑦 and 𝑝𝑝 are taken exogenously. 
At each age 𝑡𝑡, a retiree starts with a stock of financial wealth 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 and health status ℎ𝑡𝑡, and 
chooses consumption (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) and health investments (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) to maximize the present value of lifetime 
                                                                
2 Both 𝑦𝑦 and 𝑝𝑝, as well as other variables introduced below such as consumption, health, health 
investments and wealth, are individual-specific. We suppress the individual subscripts for 
simplicity. 
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utility. Let 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) be the flow utility, and 𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) be the probability of surviving to the next 
age: The individual problem can be described using Bellman equation as follows 
𝑉𝑉(𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦,𝑝𝑝) = max
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉(𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡𝑡+1; 𝑡𝑡 + 1,𝑦𝑦,𝑝𝑝) 
subject to the following budget constraint 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+11 + 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 
and the health transition function 
ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑓(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡+1; 𝑡𝑡) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is the discount factor, 𝑟𝑟 is the annual interest rate, and 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 is the expectation operator 
over the health shock 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡+1 realized at the beginning of age 𝑡𝑡 + 1. To keep the model simple, we 
ignore the bequest motives and normalize the utility in the case of death to be zero. In a different 
model, De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) cannot reject the joint hypotheses that (1) there is no 
bequest motive and (2) health does not enter the utility function directly. 
The model allows health to affect consumption through three channels. First, health 
enters the utility function directly. If the marginal utility of consumption is positively related to 
health, other things equal, individuals will prefer to consume more when healthy and less when 
ill. As health deteriorates over age, we expect consumption to decline. The opposite will be true 
if the marginal utility of consumption depends negatively on health. 
Secondly, following the seminal work of Grossman (1972), we allow individuals to affect 
the evolution of health, and consequently the optimal path of consumption through health 
investments. We allow health investments to affect both the survival probability and the health 
status conditional on survival. With a high survival probability and a better health conditional on 
survival, individuals who invest more in health should experience a faster consumption growth 
(or a slower consumption decline) when the marginal utility of consumption depends positively 
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on health. In this case, individuals could reduce future consumption by lowering current 
investments in health. Finally, we allow health shocks to affect future health and consumption. 
Euler Equation and Moment Conditions 
Combine the first order condition for 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  and the envelop condition for 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+1 , we obtain the 
following consumption Euler equation   
𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡 , 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡𝑡+1) 
where  𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡)𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  is the marginal utility of consumption. Let 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡𝑡+1)𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) − 1 
be the expectation error satisfying 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 = 0, and let 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 be a vector of variables realized before 
or at the beginning of age 𝑡𝑡, the Euler equation can be estimated using the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) with the following moment conditions 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1) = 0 
In the rest of this paper, we use these moment conditions to estimate the model 
parameters and use the estimated model to study the interaction between consumption and health 
in retirement. 
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Estimation 
To estimate the Euler equation, we specify the flow utility as 
𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) = �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼ℎ𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼�1−𝛾𝛾1 − 𝛾𝛾  
where 𝛾𝛾 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 𝛼𝛼  is the share of consumption in the 
consumption-health composite good that affects utility. This specification leads to the following 
expectation error 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾)−1 �ℎ𝑡𝑡+1ℎ𝑡𝑡 �(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛾𝛾) − 1 
which can be used in the moment conditions to estimate the model parameters. 
Our estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the survival function 
𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) using all respondents in the HRS. For simplicity, we consider here only one type of 
health investments 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡: whether a respondent participated in rigorous physical activities or not. 
The construction of this variable and the calculation of survival probabilities 𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) were 
described earlier in the data section. 
In the second step, we set the discount factor 𝛽𝛽 and the interest rate 𝑟𝑟 to typical values in 
the literature and estimate the two parameters (α  and 𝛾𝛾) in the utility function using GMM. We 
vary the values of 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑟𝑟 to check the robustness of our estimates. In practice, because what 
matters is the product 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟), we vary this product instead of individual values of 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑟𝑟. 
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We estimate the moment conditions implied from the Euler equation using single 
(divorced, never married, and widowed) retirees 65 and older. For a retiree at age 𝑡𝑡, the vector of 
instruments 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 includes age 𝑡𝑡, current health status ℎ𝑡𝑡 and the consumption growth between last 
period and current period 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
. These instruments should be valid for two reasons. First, both age 
𝑡𝑡 and health status ℎ𝑡𝑡 should be correlated with the change in health 
ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
ℎ𝑡𝑡
, while past consumption 
growth 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
  should be correlated with future consumption growth 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
. Second, because all three 
variables are known to the agent at time 𝑡𝑡, they should be uncorrelated with the expectation error 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1.  
It should be noted that, because the HRS is fielded every two years, both 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
 and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
 
represent consumption growth in two years, and  ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
ℎ𝑡𝑡
 represents the two-year health change. We 
should also adjust the discount factor 𝛽𝛽 and the interest rate 𝑟𝑟 accordingly. 
Estimation Results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results. There are three panels. The upper panel reports the 
estimates using both men and women. The middle and bottom panel reports the results for men 
and women, respectively. There are five columns, each with a different value of 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟).  
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Table 2. Estimated Model Parameters 
 𝜷𝜷(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓) 
Parameter 1 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02 
 Both Men and Women 
𝜶𝜶 0.394*** 0.358*** 0.376*** 0.411*** 0.428*** 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.052) (0.045) (0.042) 
𝜸𝜸 0.219*** 0.284*** 0.251*** 0.187** 0.156** 
 (0.080) (0.089) (0.084) (0.076) (0.072) 
      
 Men 
𝜶𝜶 0.505*** 0.484*** 0.494*** 0.515*** 0.527*** 
 (0.117) (0.141) (0.128) (0.107) (0.098) 
𝜸𝜸 0.184 0.285** 0.235* 0.134 0.084 
 (0.126) (0.141) (0.133) (0.119) (0.113) 
      
 Women 
𝜶𝜶 0.476*** 0.453*** 0.464*** 0.488*** 0.501*** 
 (0.058) (0.071) (0.064) (0.052) (0.047) 
𝜸𝜸 0.262*** 
 
0.343*** 0.303*** 0.220*** 0.178** 
 (0.083) (0.094) (0.088) (0.078) (0.073) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
As a baseline, we start with 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = 1. Using both men and women, we obtain an 
estimate of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.394 with a standard deviation of 0.048. Note that our specification of the 
utility function implies that the larger 𝛼𝛼 is, the less important health is in the utility function. In 
the extreme, when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 , health no longer has a direct effect on utility and consumption.  
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Because our estimate of 𝛼𝛼 is far below 1, it suggests that health plays an important role in utility 
and it potentially has a large direct effect on consumption. We examine this effect through 
simulation in the next section. 
Turning to the estimate of 𝛾𝛾, we obtain an estimate of 0.219 with a standard error of 0.08. 
This estimate is much lower than typical estimates from Euler equations during the working 
periods where the estimates are usually larger than 1. It is, however, not a surprise when death is 
considered. In particular, as we normalize the utility at death to be 0, we need 𝛾𝛾 < 1 to guarantee 
a positive utility while alive. 
When the model is estimated separately by gender, we obtain larger estimates of 𝛼𝛼 . 
However, the estimates for both men and women are still well below 1. The estimated 𝛾𝛾 is 
around 0.2 for both men and women, although the estimate for men is not precise due to small 
sample sizes.3   
Moving across columns, we find that the estimate of 𝛼𝛼 increases while the estimate of 𝛾𝛾 
decreases with 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟). However, both estimates are relatively stable, with 𝛼𝛼 between 0.4 and 
0.5 and 𝛾𝛾 between 0.2 and 0.3. 
Discussion 
We use the estimated model to study the interaction between health and consumption in this 
section. Recall that our model allows health to affect consumption through three channels: health 
shocks, health in utility, and health investments. We discuss each channel in turn. 
                                                                
3 Because women live longer than men on average, the sample of retired women is much larger than the sample of 
retired men. Specifically, our final sample includes 181 men and 791 women. These numbers are small relative to 
the total number of respondents in either HRS or CAMS because we use only single (divorced, never-married and 
widowed) retirees 65 or older with at least three observations of consumption ( 𝑡𝑡−1 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+1)𝑐𝑐 , 𝑐𝑐 , 𝑐𝑐  and two observations 
of health (ℎ𝑡𝑡 ,ℎ𝑡𝑡+1).  
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The simulations presented in this section use 𝛼𝛼 = 0.476 and 𝛾𝛾 = 0.262 estimated from 
women when 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = 1. Using other estimates leads to qualitatively similar results. 
Health Shocks 
Starting with health shocks. We make inferences about the effect of health shocks on 
consumption by comparing the actual consumption-age profile with the hypothetical profile 
generated from our model assuming there is no health shock 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡+1.  
We calculate the actual consumption-age profile as follows. For respondents at age 𝑡𝑡 in 
one wave and age 𝑡𝑡 + 2 in the subsequent wave4 with valid information on consumption at both 
ages, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+2 , we can calculate the two-year consumption growth as 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+2
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
 . We assume 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+2
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
 to obtain the one-year consumption growth as 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+2
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
 �0.5 . With the annual 
consumption growth for each respondent at age 𝑡𝑡, we calculate the average consumption growth 
between 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 as the median of 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
 among all respondents with valid information at age 𝑡𝑡. 
We use median to minimize the potential influence of outliers. With the average consumption 
growth at each age, we obtain the consumption-age profile by normalizing the average 
consumption at age 65 to 1.  
The dots in Figure 3 report the normalized consumption at each age. We use them as a 
benchmark of the consumption-age profiles with health shock. Consumption declines almost 
linearly with age in retirement. The average consumption of those at age 85 is about 60% of the 
average consumption of those at age 65. The annual rate of decline is about 2%.  
  
                                                                
4 Recall that both the core HRS and the CAMS are fielded every two years. 
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Figure 3. Consumption-Age Profiles with and without Health Shock 
 
To obtain the simulated consumption-age profile without health shock, we proceed as 
follows. In the absence of health shocks, we can drop the expectation operator 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 , and the 
consumption Euler equation becomes 
𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡𝑡+1) 
which, in combination with our empirical specification of the utility function, leads to 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾)−1ℎ𝑡𝑡(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛾𝛾) = 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾)−1ℎ𝑡𝑡+1(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛾𝛾) 
Rearrange the terms of the above equation, we obtain  
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= [𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)] 11−𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾) �ℎ𝑡𝑡+1ℎ𝑡𝑡 �(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛾𝛾)1−𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾)  
Given the estimated model parameters and the survival probabilities 𝜑𝜑  and health 
transitions ℎ𝑡𝑡+1
ℎ𝑡𝑡
 in the data, we can use the above equation to calculate the implied consumption 
growth at each age. As before, we obtain the consumption-age profile by normalizing the 
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average consumption at age 65 to 1. We are essentially assuming that, conditional on survival, 
future health status is perfectly anticipated and there is no health shock.  
The curve in Figure 3 reports the (normalized) consumption-age profile in the model 
without health shock. Comparing this hypothetical profile with the actual profile in data, we see 
a much faster decline of consumption over age in the absence of health shocks. This could be 
explained by the precautionary saving motive: When future health is uncertain, people will have 
an incentive to save more, resulting in a smaller decline in consumption. The large difference 
between the two profiles is consistent with De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) who find that the 
risk of medical expenditures plays an important role in explaining the saving decisions of the 
elderly.  
Health in Utility 
To understand the importance of including health in the utility function, we estimate a version of 
the model by restricting 𝛼𝛼 = 1. In this restricted model, health no longer has a direct effect on 
utility. We compare the consumption profiles from this restricted model with the corresponding 
profiles from the unrestricted model to shed light on the importance of modeling health in the 
utility function. 
Let the restricted utility function be 
𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡1−𝜃𝜃1 − 𝜃𝜃 
which, in combination with the Euler equation, leads to the following expectation error 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡) �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 �−𝜃𝜃 − 1 
Substituting this error term into the moment conditions, we can use GMM to estimate the 
new coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝜃𝜃. The results are reported in Table 3. The estimated 𝜃𝜃 
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is about 0.5 for men, and it is around 0.65 for women. As is the case for 𝛾𝛾 in the baseline model, 
the estimate of 𝜃𝜃 is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟). In the following analysis, we use 𝜃𝜃 = 0.655, the 
estimate for women when 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟) = 1. Results from other values of 𝜃𝜃 are qualitatively similar. 
Table 3. Estimated Parameters of the Restricted Model 
 𝜷𝜷(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓) 
Parameter 1 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02 
 Both Men and Women 
𝜽𝜽 0.643*** 0.709*** 0.677*** 0.607*** 0.569*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) 
      
 Men 
𝜽𝜽 0.479*** 0.557*** 0.518*** 0.438*** 0.396*** 
 (0.067) (0.074) (0.071) (0.063) (0.060) 
      
 Women 
𝜽𝜽 0.655*** 
 
0.720*** 0.688*** 0.619*** 0.581*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In the previous subsection we calculated the consumption-age profile from the baseline 
model assuming there is no health shock and plotted it in Figure 3. We can calculate the same 
profile from the restricted model using the following equation  
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= [𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)]1𝜃𝜃 
Figure 4 plots the consumption-age profiles from both the baseline model and the 
restricted model. We see that the curves are almost on top of each other. Although consumption 
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seems to decline a little bit more slowly in the restricted model, the difference between the two 
curves is extremely small. 
Figure 4. Consumption-Age Profiles with and without Health in Utility: All 
 
Does it mean that including health in the utility function provides little improvement in 
understanding consumption in retirement? The answer is no. Although the aggregate profiles are 
similar between the two models, there are significant differences arising from heterogeneity. To 
see this, we calculate the consumption-age profiles from the two models conditional on 
respondents’ current health status. Figure 5 plots the profiles from respondents in poor health 
status at each age, while Figure 6 plots similar profiles for those in excellent health. 
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Figure 5. Consumption-Age Profiles with and without Health in Utility: Poor Health 
 
Figure 6. Consumption-Age Profiles with and without Health in Utility: Excellent Health 
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For respondents in poor health, the restricted model predicts a much steeper profile than 
the unrestricted model. The reverse is true for respondents in excellent health. The differences 
arise from the effect of health on the marginal utility of consumption. In the unrestricted model 
where health has a positive effect on the marginal utility of consumption, it’s optimal for retirees 
to consume more while in better health. This leads to a steeper decline in consumption for those 
in excellent health who are expecting a health deterioration. For respondents in poor health, 
conditional on surviving, their health in the next period should not be much worse than what it is 
in the current period. A smaller decline in health thus leads to a smaller decline in consumption. 
In summary, although a model without health in the utility function can generate an 
average consumption profile similar to data by adjusting the model parameters, a model with 
health in the utility function leads to richer interactions between health and consumption and has 
the potential to match the heterogeneous consumption-age profiles based on health. 
4.3 Health Investments 
We turn now to the effect of health investments on consumption. Given the equation for 
consumption growth introduced earlier and copied below, we can calculate the consumption-age 
profile separately for each investment status 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= [𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜑𝜑(ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡)] 11−𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾) �ℎ𝑡𝑡+1ℎ𝑡𝑡 �(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛾𝛾)1−𝛼𝛼(1−𝛾𝛾)  
Figure 7 reports the results. Consumption declines much faster with age for those who 
don’t exercise. There are two reasons. First, as shown earlier in this paper, exercise has a positive 
effect on survival. Because retirees who exercise are more likely to survive to the next period, 
they have a larger incentive to save, resulting in a smaller decline in consumption over time.  
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Figure 7. Consumption-Age Profiles by Exercise Status: Model 
 
 
Secondly, conditional on survival, retirees who exercise are expected to have a better 
future health ℎ𝑡𝑡+1 than those who don’t even if both start with the same health status in the 
current period ℎ𝑡𝑡. For example, Figure 8 plots of probabilities of transiting from good to poor 
health in two consecutive surveys. Starting from the same good health status in one period, 
retirees who don’t exercise are much more likely to end up in poor health in the next period than 
those who exercise. As discussed earlier, we find the marginal utility of consumption is 
increasing in health. Other things equal, consumption is increasing in health. A better future 
health for those who exercise raises their future consumption through a higher marginal utility of 
consumption, resulting in a slower consumption decline for them than those who don’t exercise. 
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Figure 8. Probabilities of Transiting from Good to Poor Health
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For comparison, we report in Figure 9 the actual consumption-age profiles by exercise 
status from data. As in Figure 7, consumption declines faster with age for those who don’t 
exercise, although in the data it seems that majority of the differences between the two curves 
occur between age 65 and 70. 
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Figure 9. Consumption-Age Profiles by Exercise Status: Data 
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Although we analyze only one type of health investments in this paper, we expect other 
investments to have similar effects. Of particular importance is medical care utilization. With 
health in the utility function, medical care could affect individual consumption directly through 
the budget constraint and indirectly through its effect on health. While the direct effect through 
the budget constraint is more of an income/wealth effect that affects the consumption level in all 
periods and shifts the consumption-age profile up and down, the indirect effect through health, 
by altering the health-age profile, is likely to affect the allocation of consumption across periods 
and to rotate the consumption-age profile. The demand for medical care is clearly a function of 
its price, which depends on a series of policy instruments like Medicare and Medicaid. Through 
the effect on consumption and health in retirement, Medicare and Medicaid could also affect the 
adequacy of retirement savings and individual decisions to retire. One direction for future 
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research is to study the optimal design of Medicare and Medicaid by taking these effects into 
consideration. 
Conclusion 
We study the interaction between consumption and health in retirement. Our main contribution is 
the estimation of a consumption Euler equation taking health into consideration. The Euler 
equation is derived from a model of consumption in retirement with three important building 
blocks of health: health shocks, health as an investment, and health as a provider of utility. We 
estimate the Euler equation using data from the HRS and CAMS. The estimates suggest that 
health is an important determinant of utility.  
We use the estimated model to study the empirical significance of the three building 
blocks of health. We find that health shocks play an important role in slowing down the decline 
of consumption with age in retirement. Without health shocks, retirees will run down their 
wealth at a much higher speed. We also find that including health into the utility function 
provides interesting interactions between health and consumption and could help explain the 
heterogeneous consumption-age profiles related to health. Finally, we find that health 
investments, such as physical exercise, have a significant effect on the evolutions of both health 
and consumption in retirement.  
The findings in this paper suggest that public programs like Medicare and Medicaid play 
an important role in shaping the consumption and health behavior of the retirees, as well as the 
retirement and saving decisions of working people. One direction for future research is to further 
quantify the magnitude of these effects and to include these effects into the optimal design of 
these programs. 
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